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ABSTRACT 
Shareholders are organizing and mobilizing on new social media 
platforms like Twitter. This changes the dynamics of shareholder 
proxy contests in ways that favor shareholders over management. 
Disruptive technology may bring about a shareholder revolution, 
which may not be in shareholders’ best interests, at least from the 
perspective of shareholder wealth maximization, and it also has 
powerful implications for the future of corporate social 
responsibility. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Twitter offers a platform for global social interaction. Twitter users 
send “tweets,” which are a sort of 140-character text message to the 
world. About 500 million tweets are sent every day.1 This social media 
                                                                                                               
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law; J.D., 
University of Chicago Law School, cum laude; B.A., University of Florida, manga cum 
laude. 
 1. About, TWITTER, https://about.twitter.com/company (last visited Mar. 5, 2015). 
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platform can be a powerful force for enabling collective action in 
modern society. 
This essay will focus on one type of collective action that many 
scholars have concluded simply does not work. Shareholder activism, 
which has long been plagued by collective action problems including 
rational apathy and free riding, could be rejuvenated by emerging social 
media tools like Twitter. Tweets are a cheap and easy way for 
shareholders to engage with each other and build consensus and support 
for collective action. 
The notion that Twitter facilitates collective action is not new2 
(although this paper’s application of Twitter to shareholder activism is 
novel). Twitter and other forms of social media have been widely 
adopted by marketing firms and political campaigns as a means of 
coordinating otherwise disconnected individuals and groups. Perhaps 
most famously, scholars of the Arab Spring widely credit Twitter, along 
with Facebook, YouTube, and other social information networks, with 
galvanizing Arab Spring activism.3 
The Arab Spring was a revolutionary movement that began in 
Tunisia on December 17, 2010 and erupted into large-scale protests 
across the Arab world by mid-2012.4 The result of these civil uprisings 
was the overthrow of authoritarian and totalitarian leaders in Tunisia, 
Egypt, Yemen and Libya.5 The root causes of these mass protests are 
complex and multifaceted. But many scholars agree that a major catalyst 
                                                                                                               
 2. See, e.g., Alexandra Segerberg & W. Lance Bennett, Social Media and the 
Organization of Collective Action: Using Twitter to Explore the Ecologies of Two 
Climate Change Protests, 13 COMM. REV. 197 (2011) (concluding that Twitter and 
similar social technologies provide new social organizing mechanisms that provide new 
data about these movements and their participants). 
 3. See, e.g., P.N. Howard et al., Opening Closed Regimes: What Was the Role of 
Social Media During the Arab Spring?, PITPI (2011), http://pitpi.org/index.php/ 
2011/09/11/opening-closed-regimes-what-was-the-role-of-social-media-during-the-
arab-spring/. 
 4. Ismaeel Naar, Timeline: Arab Spring, AL JAZEERA (Dec. 17, 2013), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2013/12/timeline-arab-spring-
20131217114018534352.html; Garry Blight, Sheila Pulham & Paul Torpey, The Path 
to Protest, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 5, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/world/ 
interactive/2011/mar/22/middle-east-protest-interactive-timeline. 
 5. A Climate of Change, THE ECONOMIST (July 13, 2013), 
http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21580624-spring-proved-fickle-arabs-
are-still-yearning-it-says-max-rodenbeck. 
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for the Arab Spring was the advent of social media, especially Twitter, 
and its role in driving awareness and collective action.6 
I. THE REVOLUTION WILL NOT BE TELEVISED 
Many scholars have made analogies between corporations and 
nations. 7  A corporation’s charter is often referred to as a “private 
constitution.” 8  Shareholders have the right to elect the leaders of 
corporations, the board of directors, much as democratic citizens have 
the right to elect legislators. Those analogies are worth revisiting in an 
era where overly authoritarian nations risk being overthrown by the 
tweeting masses and their charismatic leaders. 
It turns out that a lot of things can be said in 140 characters. For 
example, Carl Icahn, the famous activist investor, grabbed Wall Street 
and the tech world’s attention when he tweeted caustically, “All would 
be swell at Dell if Michael and the board bid farewell.”9 However, the 
SEC-mandated disclosure that is supposed to be included on all public-
securities-related communications is not among them. 10  Another 
                                                                                                               
 6. See, e.g., Howard et al., supra note 3 (analyzing over three million tweets, 
gigabytes of YouTube content, and thousands of blog posts. The study reported three 
main findings: (1) social media played a central role in shaping political debates in the 
Arab Spring, (2) a spike in online revolutionary conversation often preceded major 
events on the ground and (3) social media helped spread democratic ideas across 
international borders).  
 7. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We 
Face: Can Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful 
Electorates Also Act and Think Long Term?, 66 BUS. LAW. 1, 8-9 (2010) (“Although 
there are obvious and important reasons not to take analogizing the governance of for-
profit corporations to the governance of actual political republics too far, it is also vital 
not to ignore the clear influence republican principles have had on the American 
approach to corporate law.”). 
 8. See Alan R. Palmiter, Public Corporation as Private Constitution, 6 ICFAI J. 
CORP. & SEC. L. 8 (2009). 
 9. Carl Icahn, TWITTER, (July 24, 2013, 8:12 AM EST), https://twitter.com/ 
carl_c_icahn/status/360054783744294913. 
 10. Recent SEC guidance allows Tweets to hyperlink to the mandatory disclosure 
legend. Whether each Tweet or just one in a series of Tweets must contain the legend is 
one of several questions remaining about how the SEC will govern tweets. See, e.g., 
Candace Jackson, SEC’s Social Media Guidance on Required Legends Raises More 
Questions, HUSCH BLACKWELL (May 12, 2014), available at 
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problem with using Twitter to communicate about securities matters is 
that it might violate Regulation Fair Disclosure. 
As a purely legal matter, Twitter is limited in its ability to facilitate 
shareholder activism. Shareholder communication rules are more liberal 
than ever,11 but shareholder voting rules remain strictly limited by SEC 
rules and securities laws. Shareholders can and do use Twitter to 
communicate and become informed about important upcoming 
shareholder votes. For example, shareholders who would never 
rationally read a 300-page proxy statement might respond to a 140-
character tweet. But if shareholders actually want to vote for a precatory 
proposal or against management, they still need to fill out a proxy card 
or attend the annual meeting to vote.12 And the proposing shareholder 
still has to actually attend the meeting.13 In an increasingly digital world, 
such traditional structures start to seem quaint, inconvenient, and 
unnecessary, leaving one to wonder why a physical meeting even needs 
to take place.14 
Attending an SEC-mandated shareholder voting procedure costs 
time and trouble beyond what a small shareholder is rationally willing to 
spend. But all that can change with online shareholder voting.15 The 
                                                                                                               
http://www.securitieslawinsider.com/2014/05/secs-social-media-guidance-on-required-
legends-raises-more-questions/. 
 11. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The SEC and the Institutional Investor: A Half-Time 
Report, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 837, 840-41 (1994). 
 12. 17 C.F.R § 240.14a–8 (2011). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Twenty-two states, including Delaware, allow virtual-only shareholder 
meetings. Federal laws are silent regarding virtual-only shareholder meetings. The New 
York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ require listed companies to provide shareholders 
with the opportunity to discuss company affairs with management, which a virtual 
meeting can supply. See, e.g., Guidelines for Protecting and Enhancing Online 
Shareholder Participation in Annual Meetings: The Best Practices Working Group for 
Online Shareholder Participation in Annual Meetings, BROADRIDGE (2012), available 
at http://media.broadridge.com/documents/Broadridge-Guidelines-For-Shareholder-
Participation-Report.pdf. 
 15. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder 
Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1745 (2006) (“A rational shareholder will 
expend the effort necessary to make informed decisions only if the expected benefits 
outweigh the costs. Given the length and complexity of corporate disclosure documents, 
the opportunity cost entailed in making informed decisions is significant. In contrast, 
the expected benefits of becoming informed are quite low, as most shareholders’ 
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SEC could do away with the rules requiring physical meetings, and the 
proxy process could be replaced with direct, real-time democracy. 
In fact, it is so onerous to attend the physical annual meetings that 
most shareholders do not go.16 Instead they submit ballots to designated 
representatives who then tabulate them and vote by proxy.17 Perhaps 
with the only exception being the widely followed and well-attended 
Berkshire-Hathaway annual meeting, most shareholders cannot justify 
the cost of exercising their voting rights in person.18 Thus, a great deal 
of shareholders cast their vote without the benefit of annual meeting 
presentations and participatory question and answer sessions.19  More 
shareholders might attend and vote electronically, if annual meetings 
were simulcast or otherwise electronically interactive.20 
The SEC could reform Rule 14a, which governs the public 
shareholder voting process, to allow voting online. The formal proxy 
solicitation process could be replaced by a more fluid and dynamic 
system to facilitate social media shareholder activism. With just a few 
liberalizing reforms, the SEC could usher in a new era of shareholder 
activism, perhaps even creating a new form of corporation, governed by 
shareholder direct democracy. 
                                                                                                               
holdings are too small to have significant effects on the vote’s outcome. Accordingly, 
corporate shareholders are rationally apathetic.”). 
 16. Lisa M. Fairfax, Mandating Board-Shareholder Engagement?, 2013 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 821, 844 (2013) (“[M]ost shareholders in public corporations are dispersed and 
hence do not attend the annual meeting in person; instead they attend and vote by 
proxy.”). 
 17. Id. 
 18. See Bainbridge, supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 19. See Fairfax, supra note 16, at 845. 
 20. A simulcast or simultaneous broadcast is the transmission of a live event across 
multiple different media simultaneously. For example, the annual meeting could be 
transmitted securely over the Internet using the H.323 Internet Protocol 
Videoconferencing standard, while it is also being held live. For more information 
about secure Internet shareholder voting over webinar simulcast, see Andrew 
Regenscheid & Geoff Beier, Security Best Practices for the Electronic Transmission of 
Election Materials for UOCAVA Voters, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH. (2011). 
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A. RULE 14A 
Rule 14a governs shareholders’ rights to present proposals at the 
annual meeting.21 In an interesting juxtaposition of history, Rule 14a 
was itself born in the crucible of war. In 1942, just a few months after 
the December 7th attack on Pearl Harbor—when democracy itself 
seemed mortally vulnerable to totalitarian regimes—Congress decided 
to bolster democracy at home through the institution of capitalism.22 
Congress determined that shareholders of public companies 
regulated by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 lacked vital rights to 
voice their concerns about corporate mismanagement. Thus Congress 
passed, and the SEC promulgated, rules allowing shareholders to 
propose “precatory proposals” for a shareholder vote. The rules, 
Congress reasoned, would provide for a kind of “shareholder 
democracy.”23 
A precatory proposal is a type of non-binding resolution. The 
shareholders get to vote on a precatory proposal, but even if it passes, 
management does not have to accede to shareholder demands. But 
precatory proposals have force nonetheless. Just like the congressman 
who needs to think about the next election almost as soon as he is 
installed in office, directors cannot afford to alienate their voting base. A 
director who constantly ignores shareholder proposals may not 
successfully stand for reelection, just as a congressman will have trouble 
securing votes if he ignores demands from his constituents.24 
                                                                                                               
 21. 17 C.F.R § 240.14a–8 (2011). 
 22. Alan R. Palmiter, The Shareholder Proposal Rule: A Failed Experiment in 
Merit Regulation, 45 ALA. L. REV. 879, 879 (1994) (“The history of Rule 14a-8 offers, 
in microcosm, a study of federal involvement in the shareholder-management 
relationship of the American public corporation. Emerging from the Great Depression, 
the SEC promulgated the rule in 1942 to catalyze what many hoped would be a 
functional ‘corporate democracy.’”). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Breaking the Corporate Governance Logjam in Washington: 
Some Constructive Thoughts on a Responsible Path Forward, 63 BUS. LAW. 1079, 
1095-96 (2008) (“A host of precatory proposals on issues like classified boards, poison 
pills, executive compensation, and even the voting system have had a powerful 
admonitory effect on corporate boards, with corporate boards often voluntarily 
assenting to non-binding proposals rather than risking wrath at the next director 
election.”). 
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The initial problem with precatory proposals was that they were 
just too easy to make. 25  Shareholders who had tiny stakes in huge 
companies could badger management with unrelated requests and pet 
projects. Over the course of the next fifty years, shareholders’ rights to 
make proposals and communicate with each other about voting for 
proposals and directors was limited by a succession of amendments to 
Rule 14a.26 In fact, Rule 14a is one of the most heavily amended rules in 
all of securities law. 27  The result of fifty years of pro-management 
amendments to Rule 14a was a shareholder voting system so convoluted 
and challenging that shareholder democracy virtually disappeared.28 
B. THE 1992 AMENDMENTS 
In 1992, the SEC finally reversed its course of the previous fifty 
years and allowed shareholders to communicate with each other about 
shareholder voting.29 SEC Chairman Richard C. Breeden gave a speech 
on October 15, 1992, announcing a total overhaul of Rule 14a. His goal 
                                                                                                               
 25. See Susan W. Liebeler, A Proposal to Rescind the Shareholder Proposal Rule, 
18 GA. L. REV. 425, 428 (1984) (“Following the rule’s adoption in 1942, the SEC 
continually revised the rule in an attempt to curb abuses by proponents and to determine 
what constitutes a ‘proper subject’ for proposals under state law.”). In fact, the 
president of the New York Stock Exchange wrote an open letter to the SEC on October 
16, 1942, opposing the new shareholder precatory proposal rule (which was then known 
as Rule X-14A-7), on the grounds that such a rule would be another brick in the wall 
between markets and efficiency. “[T]he advantages of a listed market may some day be 
outweighed by voluminous regulations[,]” NYSE President Emil Schram argued. 
Ironically, through the continued lobbying efforts of the NYSE and corporate groups, 
Rule 14a itself became a tangled morass of voluminous regulations. Letter from Emil 
Schram, President of NYSE, to Ganson Purcell, Chairman, SEC (Oct. 16, 1942), 
available at http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/1940/1942_1010_ 
SchramPurcell.pdf. 
 26. Rule 14a was amended with additional substantive and procedural restrictions 
in 1948, 1952, 1954, 1960, 1972, 1976, 1983 and 1987. 
 27. See Palmiter, supra note 22, at 882 (“Since its promulgation five decades ago, 
the rule itself has undergone no less than fourteen revisions.”). 
 28. See id. (“Lately, the agency’s interpretive flip-flops in no-action letters have 
become legion. . . . In short, the rule is today in chaos.”). 
 29. Bernard S. Black, Next Steps in Proxy Reform, 18 J. CORP. L. 1, 2 (1993) (“The 
Commission’s express goal was to make it easier for shareholders to communicate with 
each other, and the amendments certainly move in that direction. The SEC made 
important strides in that direction.”). 
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was nothing less than to change the dynamics of corporate governance 
in America.30 Breeden recognized that the SEC had created a system 
that: 
was supposed to protect shareholders [but] sometimes works to 
insulate management in problem cases from accountability to their 
shareholders . . . a system in which it takes the permission of the 
federal government, teams of lawyers and millions of dollars for 
shareholders to discuss the future of the company they own in a 
newspaper op-ed or on a radio talk show.31 
Mr. Breeden analogized the proxy system to an undemocratic political 
system: 
If the current proxy rules for corporate elections applied to our 
national political elections, then every time citizens wanted to 
discuss their views of President Bush, Bill Clinton or Ross Perot, 
they would have to file a description of themselves and their views 
with the SEC. Discussing tonight’s debate in the newspaper or on 
television would require mailing a proxy statement to every 
registered voter in the country.32 
On October 22, 1992, the SEC announced that, “[t]he purposes of 
the proxy rules themselves are better served by promoting free 
discussion, debate and learning among shareholder and interested 
persons, than by putting restraints on that process to ensure management 
has the ability to address every point raised in the exchange of views.”33 
In accord with this newly espoused democratic shareholder philosophy, 
the SEC amended the Rule in many critical ways, including rewriting it 
in a user-friendly, question-and-answer format.34 
Prior to the 1992 amendments, the SEC generally pre-reviewed all 
shareholder communications regarding a shareholder vote.35 Shareholder 
                                                                                                               
 30. Richard Breeden, Chairman, SEC, Opening Statement at the Open Meeting of 
the Commission: Shareholder Communication and Executive Compensation (Oct. 15, 
1992), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1992/101592breeden.pdf. 
 31. Id. at 2-3. 
 32. Id. at 3. 
 33. Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, Exchange Act Release 
No. 34-31326, 57 Fed. Reg. 48276-01 (Oct. 22, 1992). 
 34. Id. 
 35. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2011). 
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opinions were thereby moderated by SEC review.36 After 1992, the SEC 
no longer performed this pre-review function because most shareholder 
communications no longer had to be filed.37 
After the 1992 amendments (which were not promulgated until 
1998), shareholders received many new techniques to communicate, 
organize, meet and share information with management without 
incurring huge expense or delay. Moreover, without SEC pre-review, 
unmoderated shareholder communications were far less polite to 
management. Vitriolic shareholder messages heralded in a new era of 
aggressive shareholder campaigns against management. 
Even though Al Gore invented the Internet in the early 1990s,38 the 
SEC did not allow shareholders and companies to post shareholder 
voting materials on the Internet until 2007. 39  That year, the SEC 
                                                                                                               
 36. See Steven A. Rosenblum, The Shareholder Communications Proxy Rules And 
Their Practical Effect On Shareholder Activism And Proxy Contests, in A PRACTICAL 
GUIDE TO SEC PROXY AND COMPENSATION RULES 10-34 (Amy L. Goodman et al. eds., 
5th ed. 2013), available at http://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/AttorneyPubs/ 
WLRK.22925.13.pdf. 
 37. See id. (“Prior to the 1992 amendments, the SEC generally performed a 
moderating function in proxy contests, tempering the more aggressive materials and 
forcing the contestants to provide factual support for their arguments and assertions. 
Now, the SEC no longer performs this function for most of the materials used in the 
contest.”); see also An Overview of the Proxy Solicitation Rules, in A PRACTICAL GUIDE 
TO SEC PROXY AND COMPENSATION RULES 9-13 (Amy L. Goodman et al. eds., 5th ed. 
2013), available at http://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/AttorneyPubs/ 
WLRK.22925.13.pdf (“A benefit of circulating initial soliciting materials is that they 
are not subject to pre-review by the SEC staff. These materials are filed in definitive 
form with the SEC on the date they are first used, and can therefore be disseminated 
quickly and cost effectively to shareholders.”). 
 38. Al Gore did not actually invent the Internet. This is a reference to a political 
gaffe by the former Vice President during his interview with Wolf Blitzer of CNN on 
March 8, 1999. See Glenn Kessler, A Cautionary Tale for Politicians: Al Gore and the 
‘Invention’ of the Internet, WASH. POST (Nov. 4, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/wp/2013/11/04/a-cautionary-tale-
for-politicians-al-gore-and-the-invention-of-the-internet/. The purpose of this reference 
is to highlight that even senior government officials recognized the importance of the 
Internet for commerce at least as early as the 1990s. 
 39. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a–16 (2010). 
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amended Rule 14a to allow companies to do so (rather than require 
companies to physically mail all that paper to shareholders).40 
Making shareholder communications cheaper was clearly a primary 
purpose of the SEC in enacting this amendment.41 The SEC concluded 
that “[t]he amendments put into place processes that will provide 
shareholders with notice of, and access to, proxy materials while taking 
advantage of technological developments and the growth of the Internet 
and electronic communications.” 42  It further stated that “[t]he 
amendments also might reduce the costs of engaging in proxy contests 
for soliciting persons other than the issuer.”43 
The next advance in shareholder communication was to allow it in 
real-time through “the use of electronic shareholder forums.” 44  The 
problem is, no one really knew what an electronic shareholder forum 
                                                                                                               
 40. Internet Availability of Proxy Materials, SEC Release Nos. 34-55146; IC-
27671; File No. S7-10-05 (Jan. 29, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/ 
final/2007/34-55146.pdf. 
 41. Internet Availability of Proxy Materials, SEC Release Nos. 34-55146; IC-
27671; File No. S7-10-05 (Jan. 22, 2007). The SEC underwent a cost-benefit analysis 
and determined that “[t]he costs of solicitations ultimately are borne by shareholders.” 
Id. at 1. The SEC identified the benefits of the 2007 amendment: (1) more rapid 
dissemination of proxy information to shareholders and (2) reduced printing and 
mailing costs for issuers and other soliciting persons. Id. at 60. During the prior (2006) 
proxy season, Automated Data Processing, Inc.—the corporation which handles the 
vast majority of proxy mailings—mailed 85.3 million proxy items to beneficial owners 
at an aggregate cost of $962.4 million in printing and mailing costs. Id. at 61. While the 
2007 amendments may save the majority of the almost $1 billion annually spent on 
paper proxy mailings, the amendment also brought three notable costs: (1) the cost of 
preparing and sending a final paper notice to shareholders explaining that future notices 
would be on the Internet, (2) the cost of processing shareholders’ requests for paper 
copies, which are to be available on demand and (3) the cost to shareholders of printing 
paper copies at home. Id. at 65. The highest estimate suggested the rule may potentially 
cost up to $100 million in website publishing, administration and home printing costs, 
although most of those costs can be avoided if shareholders simply view the proxy 
materials electronically instead of printing them. In addition to finding that the 2007 
amendments would net nearly $900 million in annual savings, the SEC also found the 
amendments would improve the efficiency of the proxy voting process. Id. at 69. 
 42. Id. at 1. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Proxy Rule Amendments Encouraging 
Electronic Shareholder Forums (Nov. 28, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/ 
press/2007/2007-247.htm/. 
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was. Was it a chat room? A social media web site? An open source 
blog? 
C. SHAREHOLDER SOCIAL MEDIA 
Facebook apparently is not an “electronic shareholder forum.” 
Social media first got CEOs into trouble on July 3, 2012, when Netflix 
CEO Reed Hastings posted to his personal Facebook page, “Netflix 
monthly viewing exceeded 1 billion hours for the first time ever in 
June.” 45  Netflix stock price increased 10% that day, and the SEC 
investigated whether Hastings’ post violated Regulation Fair 
Disclosure.46 
Regulation Fair Disclosure, or Reg FD, requires public companies 
to disclose material information to all shareholders at the same time.47 
Reg FD is a relatively new rule promulgated in August 2000. At that 
time, only reporters and large investors were invited to the quarterly 
analyst conference calls, where results of the past quarter were first 
disclosed. Small investors who traded over the Internet wanted equal 
access. Reg FD granted them equal access to material non-public 
information. 
Eventually the SEC found that Reed Hastings’ Facebook post did 
not violate Reg FD.48 But that particular determination did not settle the 
SEC’s general position on the issue because the SEC expressly stated 
that the Hastings decision had no precedential value, although the report 
did set out core principles. Accordingly, to avoid liability, companies 
and management now tend to file a Form FD and 8-K for every 
potentially material tweet, blog post or other social media missive.49 
                                                                                                               
 45. Reed Hastings, FACEBOOK.COM (July 3, 2012, 10:57 AM EST), 
https://www.facebook.com/reed1960/posts/10150955446914584. The Hastings post 
was followed by a 10% increase in Netflix stock price. 
 46. Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934: Netflix, Inc., and Reed Hastings, Exchange Act Release No. 69279 (Apr. 
2, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-69279.pdf. 
 47. 17 C.F.R § 243 (2011). 
 48. See supra note 46. 
 49. See Holly J. Gregory, Social Media and Regulation FD, WEIL GOTSHAL & 
MANAGES LLP (May 2013), http://www.weil.com/~/media/files/pdfs/May2013_ 
Opinion.pdf. 
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But activist shareholders don’t have to make these filings. 50  In 
contrast to Hastings’ post, the SEC did nothing when Carl Icahn 
tweeted, “We currently have a large position in APPLE. We believe the 
company to be extremely undervalued.”51 Apple’s stock price increased 
by nearly 5% on the day of Icahn’s tweet, adding over $17 billion to its 
market capitalization at its intraday high.52 Icahn has since become a 
poster child for Twitter activism, employing Tweets to announce new 
activist efforts to the market, with great effect. Icahn’s brief dispatches 
of less than 140 characters have moved markets, including announcing a 
6% stake in Canadian oil and gas explorer Talisman Energy, resulting in 
a 6.4% stock price increase in after-hours trading,53 and announcing a 
9.4% stake in Family Dollar Stores, resulting in a 9.7% stock price 
increase in after-hours trading.54 Forbes described Icahn’s use of Twitter 
to publicize an investment in Gannett as “typical Icahn fashion.” Shares 
in the media company rose 5% in after-hours trading following Icahn’s 
announcement.55 
                                                                                                               
 50. Shareholders have some additional disclosure responsibilities after they 
become “material” filers pursuant to Regulation 13(d) or 13(g). Obtaining more than 
5% of the outstanding stock or purchasing stock with the intent to solicit a tender offer 
can trigger material filer status. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d–1 (2011). 
 51. Carl Icahn, TWITTER (Aug. 13, 2013, 11:21 AM EST), https://twitter.com/ 
carl_c_icahn/status/367350206993399808. 
 52. Steven Russolillo, The iCahn Effect: Apple’s Market Cap Jumps by $17 Billion 
After Tweets, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 13, 2013). Commentators attribute a $12.5 billion 
increase in Apple’s market cap in just one hundred minutes to the Ichan tweet. See, e.g., 
Julianne Pepitone, Carl Icahn Takes ‘Large’ Apple Stake, CNN MONEY (Aug. 13, 
2013), available at http://money.cnn.com/2013/08/13/technology/mobile/carl-icahn-
apple/. 
 53. Agustino Fontevecchia, Tweeting Carl Icahn: Billionaire Unveils 6% Stake in 
Talisman Energy, FORBES (Oct. 7, 2013, 5:45 PM EST), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
afontevecchia/2013/10/07/tweeting-carl-icahn-billioniare-investor-unveils-6-stake-in-
talisman-energy/. 
 54. William Alden, Carl Icahn Discloses Stake in Family Dollar, DEALBOOK—N 
.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/06/06/icahn-discloses-
stake-in-family-dollar/?_r=0. 
 55. Samantha Sharf, Carl Icahn Reveals Gannett Stake, Breakup Support, FORBES 
(Aug. 14, 2014, 6:28 PM EST), http://www.forbes.com/sites/samanthasharf/2014/ 
08/14/carl-icahn-reveals-gannett-stake-breakup-support/. 
2015] A LITTLE BIRDIE SAID: HOW TWITTER 707 
IS DISRUPTING SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM 
 
II. TILTING THE PLAYING FIELD AGAINST MANAGEMENT 
Shareholders can use social media in ways management cannot. 
Reg FD applies to Reed Hastings, CEO of Netflix, but not Carl Icahn, 
stockholder of Apple. Activists can now access virtually all shareholders 
and influence public opinion through social networks, relatively 
unencumbered by reporting requirements under SEC rules. But 
management cannot simply tweet back to the critiques of activists. 
Despite the fact that Hastings was found not to have violated Reg FD 
with his Facebook post, it is not clear that management can simply 
respond to activist banter without risking a disclosure violation. 
Management has to fight proxy battles in the social network arena with 
one hand tied behind its keyboard while activists use the full power of 
social media to their advantage. 
Management does have one advantage: the power of the purse. 
Management can pay for its own re-election campaign with corporate 
money. In such a “proxy contest,” management might spend up to 
$22,000,000 of corporate money to stay in power,56 which is lawful 
under Delaware law.57 However, board access to the corporate coffers to 
fund reelection campaigns—an antidemocratic feature of corporate 
law—might become less significant as shareholder engagement gets 
                                                                                                               
 56. The estimated cost of the management of CSX Corporation to battle 3G Capital 
Partners in the proxy contest announced on October 16, 2007 was $22 million. The 
dissident—who won—spent approximately $9 million to obtain board representation of 
this $18.6 billion company. SHARKREPELLANT.NET (last visited Sept. 21, 2014) (on file 
with author). 
 57. See Daniel M. Friedman, Expenses of Corporate Proxy Contests, 51 COLUM. L. 
REV. 951, 952 (1951) (“The right of the management to assess the corporate treasury 
for certain expenses incurred in the solicitation of proxies is well settled. The only 
requirement laid down by the courts is that the issue presented to the stockholders must 
involve a ‘question of corporate policy,’ as distinguished from a ‘mere matter of 
personnel.’ Once this test is met, the management may properly expend corporate funds 
to present its side of the controversy to the stockholders and solicit their continued 
support.”); see also Hand v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., 54 F. Supp. 649 (D. Del. 
1944) (“[W]here stockholders are called on to decide controversies over substantial 
questions of policy as distinguished from inconsequential matters and personnel of 
management, directors may make such expenditures from corporate funds as are 
reasonably necessary to inform stockholders of considerations in support of the policy 
advocated by directors under attack, and in such communications directors may solicit 
proxies in their favor.” (citing Hall v. Trans-Lux Daylight Picture Screen Corp., 171 A. 
226 (Del. Ch. 1934))). 
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cheaper and more democratized. 58  Modern low-cost yet effective 
shareholder campaigns abound. For example, for four consecutive years 
shareholders have organized to press ExxonMobil and other oil and gas 
companies to disclose the dangers of hydraulic fracking.59 Management 
vehemently opposed this corporate social responsibility initiative. But 
when the ExxonMobil shareholders got enough votes to pass a precatory 
proposal for fracking risk disclosure, management capitulated.60 
Other shareholder campaigns are less successful in moving 
management to change its policies, but they may yet be effective in 
accomplishing goals of awareness and corporate social responsibility. 
For example, Grassroots activist shareholders—who originally 
organized on the Internet—descended on Safeway’s annual shareholder 
meeting to protest genetically modified (“GMO”) foods. Inside the 
meeting, shareholders voted on a proposal to remove GMO foods from 
Safeway shelves that was proposed by the Sisters of Notre Dame de 
Namur, a Roman Catholic order, who owned 8,800 shares of Safeway 
stock,61 representing only about 0.00173% of the outstanding shares at 
that time.62 
Only 2% of shareholders supported the proposal to remove GMO 
ingredients from its products,63 and the proposal did not pass, but the 
demonstrations—which consisted of shareholders in biohazard suits 
                                                                                                               
 58. Tina Casey, Shareholders Press for More Disclosure from Fracking 
Companies, TRIPLEPUNDIT (May 23, 2013), http://www.triplepundit.com/2013/05/ 
shareholders-press-companies-to-disclose-fracking-risk/. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Ernest Scheyder, ExxonMobil Agrees to Share More Data on Fracking Risks, 
REUTERS, Apr. 3, 2014, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/03/us-
exxonmobil-fracking-data-idUSBREA3227020140403. 
 61. Dale Kasler, Biotech Foods Get Safeway Yes Vote—Shareholders Soundly 
Reject Ban Proposal, Sacramento Bee, May 10, 2000, at G1. 
 62. See Safeway Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Sept. 11, 1999) available at 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/86144/000095014999001830/0000950149-
99-001830.txt (“As of October 21, 1999, there were issued and outstanding 508.8 
million shares of the registrant’s common stock.”). 
 63. Sandra Gonzales, Ban on Genetically Engineered Foods Sacked by Safeway 
Shareholders Defeat Activists’ Bid, San Jose Mercury News, May 10, 2000, at C1. 
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dumping Safeway produce in garbage bins in front of the hotel where 
the annual meeting was held—attracted significant media attention.64 
Another grassroots movement, 99% Power, an offshoot from the 
Occupy Wall Street movement,65 organized protests at the shareholder 
meetings of major banks during their annual meetings in Spring 2012.66 
At least 500 protesters gathered at the Wells Fargo annual shareholders 
meeting, of which about two dozen were arrested for chaining 
themselves together to block entry to the meeting at the bank’s 
headquarters and for entering the meeting and interrupting CEO John 
Stumpf during his presentation.67 The protest, which included signs that 
read “Hells Fargo” and hand-outs of dollars bills with an image of a 
stagecoach (Wells Fargo’s corporate logo) pulled by human beings with 
the caption “Debt Slavery,” became so active that some shareholders 
were not allowed to enter the meeting.68 One such shareholder even used 
                                                                                                               
 64. See Julie Light, Seeds of Resistance: Grassroots Activism vs. Biotech 
Agriculture, CORPWATCH (May 25, 2000), http://www.corpwatch.org/ 
article.php?id=572; Kasler, supra note 61. 
 65. See Jason Cherkis, Ninety-Nine Percept Power: Activists Ready to Crash Wells 
Fargo, General Electric Shareholder Meetings, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 23, 2012, 4:09 
PM EST), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/23/ninety-nine-percent-power_n_ 
1446605.html (last updated Apr. 23, 2012, 5:00 PM EST). 
 66. The protests are well documented in mainstream media, but curiously they are 
only attributed to “the 99%” by activist media. See, e.g., Maria Poblet, 99% Power 
Movement Kicks Off with Massive Actions at Wells Fargo Shareholder Meeting, 
ALTERNET (Apr. 22, 2012) (“This year, there’s a nationally coordinated effort of the 
99% to fight back…We’re starting off with Wells Fargo.”), available at 
http://www.alternet.org/story/155097/99_power_movement_kicks_off_with_massive_a
ctions_at_wells_fargo_shareholder_meeting; Tcnk, 99% Power—Wells Fargo 
Shareholders Meeting Disrupted, IN YOUR FACE RADIO (Apr. 26, 2012), available at 
http://inyourfaceradio.net/99-power-wells-fargo-shareholders-meeting-disrupted-mic-
check/; 99% Power Week of Action: Confront the Corporate 1% April 22-28, 
ACTIONWEB (“Tuesday’s action was the first in a series of nation-wide protests set to 
taking on America’s largest corporations over the next two months, organized by a 
national coalition of progressive organizations called 99% Power.”), available at 
https://actionnetwork.org/campaigns/99-power-week-of-action-confronting-the-
corporate-1-including-walmart-bank-of-america-wellsfargo-and-sallie-april-22-28 
(official website of the 99% Power movement) (last visited Jan. 16, 2015). 
 67. Dakin Campbell & Mark Chediak, Wells Fargo Protestors Disrupt Stump 
Speech at Meeting, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 25, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2012-04-24/wells-fargo-protesters-impede-shareholders-at-annual-meeting. 
 68. Josh Harkinson, Wells Fargo Turns Away Its Own Shareholders from Its 
Shareholder Meeting, MOTHER JONES (Apr. 24, 2012, 5:28 PM EST), 
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the protest’s Twitter hashtag to voice her frustration that the protest 
prevented her from voting her shares.69 
Just like the physical protests in the Arab Spring that were 
organized through social media platforms, grassroots shareholder 
activism can be organized and empowered by Twitter and Facebook. In 
fact, the Wells Fargo protest was planned, organized and broadcast live 
using social media. The web site “Stop Wells Fargo” was established to 
focus attention on and raise support for “major disruptions” at the Wells 
Fargo shareholder meeting.70 Visitors to that website were invited to 
“Follow the action on Twitter with #wf24 #wfshareholders 
#notfeelingwells71 and on Facebook.72 
Such happenings suggest that shareholder activism may face some 
of the same challenges as political activism and potentially look less like 
Bulldog Investors73 and more like Occupy Wall Street.74 Brayden King75 
                                                                                                               
http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2012/04/wells-fargo-turns-away-its-own-
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Shareholder Meeting As “The 99% Take Over” (Apr. 24, 2012), 
http://www.stopwellsfargo.com/en/press (“On Tuesday, April 24, thousands of people 
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 71. Id. (“Follow the action on Twitter with #wf24 #wfshareholders 
#notfeelingwells [and] On Facebook at: http://www.facebook.com/events/ 
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 72. Id.; see also The 99% Take Over #wf24, FACEBOOK (last visited Mar. 5, 2015),  
https://www.facebook.com/events/203308649774621/ (Facebook page used to inform 
participants about Stop Wells Fargo protests). 
 73. Bulldog Investors is run by activist investor Phillip Goldstein, who is notable 
for his consistent value-oriented investment strategy. Goldstein identifies companies 
that appear to be undervalued because of mismanagement and seeks to replace 
management. 
 74. Occupy Wall Street was a grassroots protest movement characterized by 
concerns with global and social inequality but lacking central leadership or a clear 
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has noted that activism through social media is inherently different from 
“classic” activism. It is not, “we are going to tout the party line, we are 
going to say what the NGOs are telling us to say.” Instead, King notes 
that it is, “we are going to personalize it. And this can catch activists by 
surprise. They may have gotten the ball rolling, but what actually occurs 
falls out of the control of any hierarchical entity.”76 The most poignant 
distinction is that grassroots shareholder activism can quickly become 
unpredictable. 
Grassroots shareholder activism is not necessarily directed at 
unlocking shareholder value. There have been numerous studies on 
whether shareholders’ ability to control or at least reign in corporate 
activity increases share prices.77 This inquiry is particularly pertinent to 
the shareholder social media activism. Many grassroots shareholder 
campaigns are sponsored by shareholders with minimal holdings. The 
old name for these pesky shareholders was “corporate gadflies.”78 Some 
gadflies are peskier than others: two-thirds of all proposals submitted to 
Fortune 150 companies between January 1, 2008 and August 1, 2011 by 
individual investors came from Evelyn Davis and members of the 
Steiner, Chevedden, and Rossi families.79 
Non-profits have formed solely to purchase minimal amounts of 
securities and leverage Rule 14a to make precatory proposals to major 
                                                                                                               
message. In fact, Adbusters lampooned the movement in a poster for it that read, “What 
is our one demand? #occupywallstreet September 17th. Bring Tent.” See Michael Bierut, 
The Poster that Launched a Movement (Or Not), The Design Observer Group (April 30, 
2012), http://designobserver.com/feature/the-poster-that-launched-a-movement-or-not/ 
32588/. 
 75. Northwestern University Kellogg School of Management, Associate Professor 
of Management and Organizations, http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/ 
directory/king_brayden.aspx. 
 76. Jessica Love, Corporate Activism Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow, KELLOGG 
INSIGHT (Mar. 3, 2014), available at http://insight.kellogg.northwestern.edu/article/ 
corporate_activism_yesterday_today_and_tomorrow (Interview with Brayden King & 
Klaus Weber). 
 77. See, e.g., Activists Beat S&P 500 in 48 Percent Gain for Shareholders, 
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 31, 2014), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/infographics/ 
2014-03-31/activists-beat-s-p-500-in-48-percent-gain-for-shareholders.html. 
 78. The gadfly is a tiny fly that annoys horses. The name also refers to a person 
who upsets the status quo. 
 79. James R. Copland, A Report on Corporate Governance and Shareholder 
Activism, PROXY MONITOR (Sept. 2011), http://www.proxymonitor.org/Reports/ 
Proxy_Monitor_2011.pdf. 
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corporations. As You Sow, a non-profit founded in 1992 to increase 
corporate accountability, launched its shareholder activism program in 
1997,80 whereby As You Sow would purchase $2,000 in securities, hold 
them for one year, then make precatory proposals related to various 
social issues.81 Corporate social responsibility activist As You Sow is a 
perfect example of how a shareholder may purchase securities for 
purposes other than value creation. 
Whether shareholder democracy is good or bad is an immensely 
personal and political question. Corporate law has not—and may 
never—settle on whether corporations must maximize shareholder 
wealth or prioritize corporate social responsibility. It is clear, however, 
that social media, in an age of already increasing shareholder democracy 
and activism, is a powerful new tool for proponents of corporate social 
responsibility. 
III. TECHNOLOGY AND DEMOCRATIC SHAREHOLDER REFORMS 
A public corporation is similar to a republic in that both 
employ representative democracy. Shareholders delegate broad 
decision-making powers to a board of directors, just as voting citizens 
delegate lawmaking powers to legislators. A direct democracy,82 on the 
other hand, allows citizens to directly partake in voting on policy 
                                                                                                               
 80. This program was formerly described on the website of As You Sow under a 
section titled “Our Methods,” but that non-profit has since removed any explanation of 
its methods from its web site. Instead, their tactic is now described in a blurb titled 
“Power of the Proxy” on their web site. Our Work, AS YOU SOW, 
http://www.asyousow.org/our-work/. 
 81. See id. As You Sow has proposed shareholder votes on topics including: no 
smoking in movies (not only in the theatre but also on the screen), keeping 
nanomaterials and genetic modifications out of food, reducing consumer packaging, 
eliminating child labor from cotton fields in Uzbekistan and mineral mines in the 
Congo and reducing executive compensation. 
 82. Examples of political direct democracies include the ancient Greek city-state of 
Athens and the modern Swiss Cantons of Glarus and Appenzell Innerrhoden. 
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decisions by referendum.83 The framers of the American constitution 
disfavored direct democracy,84 as does corporate law. 
Historic transformations in the way we communicate could make 
corporate direct democracy, in which shareholder voters play an integral 
role in a broad scope of corporate decision-making, possible and even 
practical. With just a few SEC-sponsored tweaks to the federal securities 
law and some modifications to key state statutes like the Delaware 
General Corporations Law, American public companies could be run as 
direct democracies. Innovations like webcasting, Twitter and Internet 
Protocol Security make it feasible for shareholders to gain immediate 
access to extensive managerial and operational information and vote in 
real-time on a wide array of corporate matters. 
In light of the social-media organized mass movements like the 
Arab Spring and Occupy Wall Street—and being mindful of corporate 
social responsibility organizations like As You Sow—would 
shareholder direct democracy be a glorious conclusion to the capitalist 
era, or would it be a crippling impediment to efficient economic 
functioning? Some may have a bias toward one approach or the other. 
But a middle road to this modern circumstance is to let the market 
determine which corporate political structure is best. 
The SEC does not have to mandate corporate direct democracy. But 
the SEC could allow it. Individual public corporations would then have 
the option to allow shareholder direct democracy or retain the traditional 
framework of delegation to and representation by a board of directors. 
Empirical studies are conflicted on whether shareholder primacy is 
efficient, and whether markets value it. 85  A 2003 study found that 
                                                                                                               
 83. Some American states allow citizen-sponsored direct initiatives to amend the 
state constitution, including: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North 
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon and South Dakota. 
 84. Alexander Hamilton stated “that a pure democracy, if it were practicable, 
would be the most perfect government. Experience has proved, that no position in 
politics is more false than this. The ancient democracies, in which the people 
themselves deliberated, never possessed one feature of good government. Their very 
character was tyranny; their figure deformity. When they assembled, the field of debate 
presented an ungovernable mob, not only incapable of deliberation, but prepared for 
every enormity.” Alexander Hamilton, Speech on the Compromises of the Constitution, 
Poughkeepsie, New York (June 20, 1788) in THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 22 
(Federal Edition, vol. 2, Henry Cabot Lodge ed., G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1904), available 
at http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/1379. 
714 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XX 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
stronger shareholder rights correlated with higher firm value, higher 
profits, higher sales growth, lower capital expenditures and fewer 
corporate acquisitions. 86  But in 2013, Lynn Stout argued that more 
recent studies conclusively show that shareholder primacy does not 
maximize shareholder value (measured by share price).87 
Maximizing shareholder value, however, is only one goal of 
corporate activity. Corporate social responsibility is, increasingly, 
another. Corporate direct democracy should not be prohibited as a 
possible corporate form even if it does not maximize shareholder value 
in every instance or even in the majority of cases. 
Certain businesses may benefit from direct shareholder democracy 
while others may be harmed by it. Highly secretive firms like Apple, for 
instance, may find their bottom line is hit hard when decisions are made 
by the masses. Organic food retailers like Whole Foods, however, may 
find shareholder direct democracy gives them legitimacy in a 
marketplace where shoppers choose the most transparent and 
community oriented company. 
In point of fact, many corporations today voluntarily expend 
money, make disclosures, and commit to social-benefit promises to 
become certified as benefit corporations, or B-corporations. 88  A B-
corporation is a type of for-profit entity that has some non-profit 
characteristics (but not its tax-exempt treatment). The shareholders of a 
B-corporation agree (at least theoretically) to evaluate the company 
based on its societal or environmental impact, and not solely on its 
profits. 
The corporate landscape is changing. Corporations have a broader 
range of purposes than they did even a few short years ago. The world is 
                                                                                                               
 85. See., e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of 
Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 642 (2006). 
 86. Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity 
Prices, 118 Quarterly J. Econ. 107, 107 (2003). 
 87. Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder Value Myth, CORNELL LAW FACULTY 
PUBLICATIONS, http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/771/. 
 88. Today, there are at least twelve third-party companies that provide standards 
and evaluations to register as a “B-corporation.” “B-corporation” is not a legal status. 
The designation is more like a USDA Organic certification. Most B-corporations are, 
from a legal perspective, Delaware corporations that do not make the “S” election. 
However, B-corporations in certain states may not have to conform with shareholder 
wealth maximization modes of existence, such as those articulated by the seminal case, 
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 
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changing, too. Technology is allowing people to connect and coordinate 
across virtually any distance, regardless of social or political barriers. 
Corporate America is not immune to these changes. New forms of 
corporations are emerging, as are new forms of corporate governance, 
and new goals of investors. In light of these changes, the SEC has the 
opportunity to unlock shareholder governance, allowing states to create 
new kinds of corporations. Justice Brandeis famously stated that, “It is 
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous 
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel 
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the 
country.”89 Shareholder direct democracy is a prime example of just 
such an economic experiment. Continuing the trend of shareholder 
empowerment exemplified by states like North Dakota,90 a courageous 
state might take on Delaware’s hegemony over incorporation by 
offering shareholders an unprecedented level of influence and 
involvement in the companies they own. 
One way to unlock new shareholder governance regimes is simply 
to allow Internet voting. The shareholder annual meeting is an 
anachronism. It imposes great expenses on shareholders, effectively 
excluding many would-be participants. The direct beneficiaries of the 
current system are the institutional investors. Small shareholders who 
cannot afford to attend the meeting are excluded from the process, or at 
the very least left with limited access to information and diminished 
interaction with board members and management, just as small 
shareholders who were not invited to attend the quarterly analyst calls 
were excluded from timely receiving material non-public information. 
Corporations will either modify their bylaws to allow virtual 
shareholder meetings and Internet voting, or they will preserve the status 
quo. By opening up a new avenue for shareholder engagement, the SEC 
will create an opportunity for the market to decide what mixture of 
shareholder corporate control it values most—even if that control is 
democratized. 
                                                                                                               
 89. New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932). 
 90. See Larry Ribstein, The North Dakota Experiment, THE HARVARD LAW 
SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (Apr. 23, 
2007), available at http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2007/04/23/ 
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CONCLUSION 
The shareholder revolution will not be televised. It will be 
simulcast, tweeted, liked, shared and +1’d. Human communication is 
changing due to technologic advancement, and inter-shareholder 
communication is changing along with it. SEC rules about how 
shareholders may communicate with each other and management 
currently restrain the potentially disruptive force of innovative 
communication, but changes to a few simple rules could open up a 
world of new possibilities for shareholder activism. If the last twenty-
five years of shareholder regulation tend to predict its future, the trend 
of SEC liberalization of shareholder communication will likely 
continue. Shareholder democracy, long considered a myth, may soon 
become a reality. The question remains, how much democracy do we 
really want? 
